Introduction The central scenarios of Victory Games Aegean Strike are hypothetical World War III contests, pitting the mid-1980s U.S. military […]
Techniques for Safely Delivering Heavy U.S. Ground Reinforcements to Iran in Gulf Strike
Gulf Strike is a game of planning. Let me repeat that. Gulf Strike is a game of planning. I could probably just end the article right here and consider it a great public service to the Gulf Strike playing community, but ego compels me to expound. Planning, at all levels, is essential to winning this game, from “big picture” theater-wide planning all the way down to planning missions for Special Forces detachments. This article examines the challenge of safely delivering heavy U.S. ground reinforcements via naval transport to the theater of operations covered by Gulf Strike Scenario 2.
Rules Questions Nick Karp (Designer) Responses to Vietnam: 1965-1975 Rules Questions Q: Rule “5.5 Casualties”, under the section “Allocating Losses” […]
Errata for “Vietnam: 1965-1975”, as of October 1984 By Victory Games (Victory Insider #6, The General 21-5) Counters […]
Errata for “Pacific War”, as of April 1986
Clarification: When naval units engage fortifications, combat occurs during the Naval Combat Cycle. The fortification is treated as an unactivated naval unit, and range is bid by both sides according to the Naval Combat Procedure. The only difference is that the naval units use their Gunnery Strength (not Bombardment Strength) and calculate the effect on the Bombardment vs. Installation line of the Air/Naval CRT.
“Cavalry Stone Wall” in The Civil War Technique for Delaying an Enemy Army on the Move Overview Even […]
House Rules for Victory Games’ “The Civil War” NSPs without Naval Leaders – Naval Strength Points (NSPs) without Naval […]
By Gary Andrews and Fred W. Manzo Introduction Hannibal: Rome vs. Carthage is not a balanced game. Undoubtedly […]
House Rules for Bethpage, Long Island, NY Gamer’s group Repeated Reorganization Operations – Although the rules clearly state that […]
A Fighting Chance for the South in the Early Days of the Korean War
The great challenge of playing historical military games is trying to surpass the achievements (or at least avoid the disasters) of the historical commanders. We try to beat Napoleon’s time to Moscow; defend the tactical donut at Alesia more successfully than Caesar (although he did it well); and actually attempt to score a knockout against the British with our Continentals in 1776. All of this makes for fascinating play, but many of these simulations are, well… lopsided. One side acts as the aggressor until they either succeed or run out of steam. If the initial defender survives, he may be able to transition to the offensive. But by this time the initial attacker is usually a spent force. What follows is more of a mop-up operation that a true operational shift in initiative.